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I. There Is A Circuit Conflict Regarding Whether 
The ADEA Precludes A Section 1983 Action 
To Redress Unconstitutional Age-Based Dis-
crimination 
The Third Circuit decision in this case expressly 
recognized that it conflicts with the Seventh Circuit 
decision in Levin v. Madigan, 692 F. 3d 607 (7th Cir. 
2012) ("Levin I"). Pet.App. 15a, 16a, 18a, 19a. The 
Seventh Circuit decision in Levin I was avowedly in-
consistent with earlier decisions in the Fourth, Fifth, 
Ninth and Tenth Circuits. 692 F.3d at 616. A series of 
district court decisions have recognized this circuit 
split. Pet. 11. Although these appellate and trial court 
decisions have divergent views about the merits, they 
agree that there is a well-established circuit conflict. 
(1) Respondent asserts that "Levin's extended 
analysis of whether the ADEA preempts age discrim-
ination suits under § 1983 was limited to whether it 
does so for non-ADEA-covered employees." Br.Opp. 
11. That is incorrect. Nothing in the Seventh Circuit's 
analysis of the preclusion issue is "limited to," or even 
about, non-ADEA-covered workers. That analysis as-
sumed that Levin was covered by the ADEA.1 
1 The Seventh Circuit argued that because this Court has 
invalidated the ADEA insofar as it authorizes actions against 
states, Ki1nel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000), 
"[w]ithout the availability of a § 1983 claim, a state employee 
(like Levin) who suffers age discrimination in the course of his 
employment is left without a federal damages remedy." 692 F.3d 
(Continued on following page) 
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The Seventh Circuit decision in Levin I treated 
the preclusion issue as posing a single question -
whether the ADEA precludes section 1983 Equal Pro-
tection age discrimination claims - , not several dif-
ferent questions depending on whether a particular 
plaintiff or claim is covered or remedied by theADEA. 
The Seventh Circuit explained that "the issue before 
us [is] whether the ADEA precludes a § 1983 equal 
protection claim," 692 F.3d at 615, and "conclude[d] 
that the ADEA is not the exclusive remedy for age 
discrimination in employment claims." 692 F.3d at 
622. During the oral argument in Madigan v. Levin, 
cert. dismissed, 134 S.Ct. 2 (2014), Justice Sotomayor 
correctly described the decision in Levin I: 
[T]he Seventh Circuit held that no one is 
precluded from a section 1983 claim whether 
they're an employee or a non-employee. That's 
the way the case was litigated. That's the 
way they decided. The broad statement, 
whether he's an employee or not an employee 
... he has [a] 1983 action. 
Oral Argument 37, available at 2013 WL 5522663. 
Justice Scalia noted that the Seventh Circuit had 
decided that the ADEA does not preclude section 1983 
claims by covered employees. See n.8, supra. That is 
how the Seventh Circuit decision in Levin I was also 
characterized by counsel for the state petitioner at 
at 621. That argument necessarily assumed that Levin was 
covered by the ADEA, and would thus be affected by Kimel. 
3 
oral argument in this Coure and by counsel for the 
state on remand in Levin. 3 
The brief in opposition illustrates the well-
developed nature of the circuit split. Respondents 
argue that under Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 
(1984) and Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Commit-
tee, 555 U.S. 246 (2009), the mere existence of a com-
prehensive statutory remedial scheme would bar 
section 1983 action to enforce a constitutional right, 
as it usually would bar a section 1983 action to 
enforce a statute. Br.Opp. 20-28 (citing Middlesex 
County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers 
Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981)). That very argument is the 
linchpin of the Third Circuit decision below. Pet.App. 
10-21. But the Seventh Circuit in Levin I em-
phatically rejected this approach. 692 F.3d at 611-21. 
2 Oral Argument, 20 ("MR. SCODRO: ... [T]he Seventh Cir-
cuit .. . pronounced a rule that was indifferent as between ap-
pointees and employees."). 
3 Defendants' Response to Plaintiff's Status Report, Levin 
v. Madigan, available at 2014 WL 1030446 ("[T]he appellate 
court ... held that the ADEA did not displace the § 1983 remedy 
for any individuals, whether or not they were 'employees' under 
the statute. See [692 F.3d] at 621-22 .... [T]he appellate court's 
broad holding regarding ADEA displacement made no distinc-
tion between covered and exempted individuals."); Defendants-
Appellants' Response to Plaintiff-Appellee's Motion to Dismiss 
Appeal for Lack of Jurisdiction or for Summary Affirmance, No. 
14-2244 (7th Cir.), 9 (noting the ''broad ruling from this Court 
in Levin I that the ADEA did not displace a § 1983 age discrimi-
nation claim for both employees under that statute and non-
employees."). 
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"For the preclusion of constitutional claims, we be-
lieve more is required than a comprehensive remedial 
scheme." 692 F.3d at 618 (emphasis in original). 
"[E]ven though the ADEA is a comprehensive re-
medial scheme, ... we cannot say that the ADEA's 
scheme alone is enough to preclude § 1983 consti-
tutional claims." 692 F.3d at 618. Respondents do 
not contend that the ADEA meets the more demand-
ing standard applied to section 1983 constitutional 
claims by the Seventh Circuit in Levin I. 
Respondents suggest that the subsequent Sev-
enth Circuit in Levin v. Madigan, 2014 WL 6736999 
(7th Cir. Sept. 30, 2014) ("Levin IT'), "characterized 
its prior, original decision (on which petitioner now 
relies) solely in terms of its conclusion that the under-
lying equal protection rights were clearly established, 
without regard to the § 1983 preemption question." 
Br.Opp. 14 n.2 (emphasis added). To the contrary, in 
Levin II the Seventh Circuit clearly described the 
preclusion holding in Levin I. "The first appeal ... 
included the argument that age discrimination claims 
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are preempted by the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act. This court 
rejected that preemption argument .... " Levin II, 2014 
WL 6736999 at *1. Respondents also assert that in 
Levin II the Seventh Circuit indicated that Levin I 
had no bearing on whether the ADEA precluded a 
section 1983 action of a covered employee. 
[W]hen the Levin defendants filed an inter-
locutory appeal of a district court ruling on 
remand that Levin's § 1983 claims were not 
5 
preempted by the Government Employee 
Rights Act - an enactment not previously 
-considered in the litigation extending ADEA-
type rights to government employees, like 
Levin, who are exempted from ADEA cover-
age - the Seventh Circuit declined to hold 
that Levin already resolved the preemption 
issue for this non-covered employee. 
Br.Opp. 14 n.2 (emphasis added). The phrase "de-
clined to hold" suggests that Levin II actually ana-
lyzed the defendant's new preclusion contention, and 
in doing so rejected an argument that Levin I applied 
to covered employees. But in fact Levin II simply 
never reached the preclusion issue; the Seventh Cir-
cuit merely rejected qualified immunity. "This court 
already has ruled ... that the appellants are not en-
titled to qualified immunity, regardless of the preemp-
tion question.... [G]iven the court's earlier ruling 
on qualified immunity, we need not address preemp-
tion in this appeal." Levin II, 2014 WL 6736999 at *1. 
The defendants-appellants in Levin II agreed that 
Levin I applied to ADEA-covered employees. See n.3, 
supra. 
(2) Respondents argue in the alternative that in 
Levin I the Seventh Circuit should not have decided 
whether the ADEA precludes section 1983 Equal 
Protection actions by ADEA-covered employees. None 
of the various iterations of this argument are persua-
sive. 
The Seventh Circuit decision does not contain 
distinct analyses and holdings dealing separately 
6 
with section 1983 actions by ADEA-covered and non-
ADEA-covered workers. The analysis in Levin I of 
this Court's decisions in the Sea Clarrimers and 
Robinson line of cases was equally applicable to both 
groups of potential plaintiffs. The Seventh Circuit. 
was not obligated to look for some alternative ground 
that applied only to one group or the other. 
It is assuredly not the case, as respondents sug-
gest, that the "facts" in Levin I involved a non-covered 
employee. To the contrary, at the time of Levin I the 
parties were embroiled in a protracted legal dispute 
about whether Levin was covered by the ADEA. In 
2008 a district court decision in the Levin litigation 
held that Levin was covered. Levin v. Madigan, 2008 
WL 4286668 at *2-*5 (N.D.Ill. Sept. 12, 2008). Three 
years later another district court decision in that case 
concluded that Levin was not covered. Levin v. Madi-
gan, 2011 WL 2708341 at *9-*11 (N.D.Ill. July 12, 
2011). The appeal in Levin I was limited to whether 
the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity; 
the coverage issue was not before the Seventh Circuit. 
Respondents imply that the Seventh Circuit in 
Levin I resolved the dispute about whether Levin was 
covered by the ADEA. That is not so. Respondents 
assert that "the Seventh Circuit noted in describing 
the procedural background of the case, [that] ... Levin. 
was 'not an "employee" for purposes of Title VII and 
the ADEA, thus foreclosing any claim Levin could 
bring under those statutes.' Levin, 692 F.3d at 610 
(emphasis added)." Br.Opp. 11. But the quoted pas-
sage from Levin I is not a holding by the appellate 
7 
court regarding Levin's status, but only a description 
of the 2011 district court opinion. The Seventh Circuit 
did not "note[] . . . that Levin was 'not an "em-
ployee" '"; rather, it noted that "[District] Judge 
Chang [in 20 11] determined that Levin is not an 
'employee' .... " 692 F.3d at 610. 
Respondents insist that "[t]he Seventh Circuit 
never addressed, let alone reversed, the district 
court's finding that Levin was not covered by the 
ADEA." Br.Opp. 11. But the Seventh Circuit failed to 
"reverse[]" the 2011 district court conclusion because 
the appellate court's limited jurisdiction over the 
qualified immunity appeal did not include the cover-
age issue. 
Respondents assert that it is "clear that the Sev-
enth Circuit was not asked to decide whether an 
ADEA-covered employee may bring an age discrimi-
nation suit under § 1983." Br.Opp. 10 (emphasis 
added and omitted). That is not correct. The defen-
dants in Levin urged the Seventh Circuit to broadly 
hold that the ADEA bars section 1983 Equal Pro-
tection claims. Their argument that was never lim-
ited to any particular group of workers,4 and their 
4 Brief of Defendants-Appellants, Levin v. Madigan, No. 11-
2820 (7th Cir.), 13 ("the ADEA's comprehensive remedial scheme 
forecloses constitutional claims by state or local employees for 
age discrimination in employment under § 1983."), 16, 17; Reply 
Brief of Defendants-Appellants, Levin v. Madigan, No. 11-2820 
(7th Cir.), 7 ("the ADEA displaces § 1983 claims by state and 
local employees for violations of the Equal Protection Clause 
based on age"), 8. 
8 
brief did not even mention the dispute regarding 
whether Levin himself was covered by the ADEA. 
The defendants repeatedly argued in Levin I that if 
section 1983 actions were not precluded, employees 
could "circumvent," "avoid," and "evade" the ADEA 
administrative scheme,5 an argument that was only 
applicable to ADEA-covered employees. Similarly, 
Levin urged the Seventh Circuit to hold that the 
ADEA does not preclude section 1983 claims, a con-
tention that was not limited to or directed at any 
particular group of potential plaintiffs. 6 As counsel for 
the petitioners in Madigan v. Levin correctly ex-
plained to this Court during the oral argument, "the 
Seventh Circuit was asked to announce a rule that is 
indifferent as to employees and appointees." Oral 
Argument, 20.7 
(3) In this Court the problem which led to the 
dismissal of the writ in Madigan v. Levin arose be-
cause of the particular manner in which the peti-
tioners framed the Question Presented. 
5 Brief of Defendants-Appellants, 12, 20, 22, 23. 
6 Brief of Plaintiff, Appellee, Harvey Levin, 37, available at 
2012 WL 6763830; see Reply Brief for Petitioners, Madigan v. 
Levin, 2 (''Respondent never argued below that [if he is not cov-
ered by the ADEA] his § 1983 claim survives even if an employ-
ee's would not."). 
7 In the Madigan litigation, the parties used the term "em-
ployee" to refer to covered individuals and "appointee" to refer to 
certain non-covered workers. Section 630(f) of the ADEA defines 
"employee" (the persons covered by the Act) to exclude certain 
appointees. 29 U.S.C. § 630(f). 
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Although the Seventh Circuit in Levin I had 
broadly held (without limitation as to any particular 
type of worker) that the ADEA does not preclude 
section 1983 actions, the petition in Madigan set out 
a Question Presented that was limited to workers 
who actually are covered by the ADEA. 
Whether the Seventh Circuit erred in holding 
... that state and local government employees 
may avoid the Federal Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act's comprehensive remedial 
regime by bringing age discrimination claims 
directly under the Equal Protection Clause 
and 42 U.S.C. §1983. 
Pet., i (emphasis added). Only ADEA-covered workers 
could be said to "avoid" the ADEA remedial scheme by 
filing a section 1983 action. 
Petitioners' merits brief, however, proceeded on 
the assumption that Levin was not covered by the 
ADEA at all. Brief for Petitioners, 37. Respondent in 
turn acknowledged that the 2011 district court deci-
sion in that case had held that Levin was not covered 
by the ADEA; in a deliberately phrased statement, 
respondent observed: "There is no realistic possibility 
that this determination will be overturned on ap-
peal." Brief for Respondent, 9. In reply, petitioners 
did not argue that there was a significant chance 
that the Seventh Circuit might at some point in the 
future hold that Levin was covered by the ADEA. 
Instead, they contended that the ADEA precludes 
section 1983 claims by non-covered workers. Reply 
10 
Brief for Petitioners, 3. But the Question Presented 
was not about non-covered workers. 
At oral argument in Madigan, the posture of the 
case became even more complicated. Counsel for re-
spondent reiterated that there was not a "realistic 
possibility" the Seventh Circuit would hold Levin was 
covered by the ADEA, but repeatedly balked when 
asked to formally stipulate that Levin was not cov-
ered. Oral Argument 26-29, 37-38. Counsel for peti-
tioners at first argued that the ADEA precluded 
section 1983 actions by even non-covered workers, id. 
at 16, but later appeared to say the opposite. Id. at 
49. The Court subsequently dismissed the writ as 
improvidently granted. 134 S.Ct. 2 (2013). 
This regrettable series of developments did not 
alter the meaning or significance of the Seventh Cir-
cuit decision in Levin I or the conflict that it created.8 
II. The Question Presented Is Ripe for Review 
by This Court 
When this Court granted review in Madigan v. 
Levin, the question at issue had been addressed by 
8 Oral Argument, 41-42: "JUSTICE SCALIA: ... [W]e're 
asked to review a holding by the Seventh Circuit that even if ... 
you're not exempt, you still have a 1983 claim. That's- that's 
why we took this case. And now you're - you're telling us we 
should not review what the Seventh Circuit held. And that would 
presumably remain the circuit law, right? MR. THEOBALD: Yes, 
Your Honor." 
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the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth and Tenth Circuits. 
The question presented has now also been considered 
at length by the Third Circuit. The legal issues in-
volved have been well vetted by the lower courts, and 
the question is ripe for decision by this Court. 
Respondents suggest that review be deferred to 
permit the lower courts to further debate the sig-
nificance of this Court's 2009 decision in Fitzgerald. 
Br.Opp. 17. But we emphatically did not contend (and 
respondents do not contend) that the decision in 
Fitzgerald changed the governing standard. To the 
contrary, the petition makes abundantly clear that 
Fitzgerald merely applied the same standard utilized 
in the 1984 decision in Smith v. Robinson. Pet. 13-21. 
Respondents themselves acknowledge that petitioner's 
"criticism of Hildebrand rests on his ... reading of 
the legal standard applied in Smith and Fitzgerald." 
Br.Opp. 19 (emphasis added). The Seventh Circuit in 
Levin I relied on this Court's decisions in Robinson 
and in Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), as 
well as on Fitzgerald. 692 F. 3d at 612-19. 
Further delay was not warranted when this Court 
granted review almost two years ago in Madigan v. 
Levin, and it would make even less sense today. It is 
unlikely that other lower courts will add significantly 
to the detailed and well-reasoned conflicting decisions 
of the Third Circuit in the instant case and of the 
Seventh Circuit in Levin I. Respondents do not sug-
gest that further consideration of the 2009 decision 
in Fitzgerald is going to eliminate the conflict by 
prompting the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Tenth 
12 
Circuits to all abandon their well-established hold-
ings that the ADEA precludes section 1983 Equal 
Protection claims for age discrimination. The con-
trolling issue in the lower courts has been a dis-
agreement about the relationship between the Sea 
Clammers line of cases and the Smith line of cases; 
additional lower court commentary about the mean-
ing of this Court's past decisions will not enhance 
this Court's ability to resolve the question presented. 
III. This Case Presents An Excellent Vehicle for 
Resolving The Question Presented 
This case presents an ideal vehicle for deciding 
the question presented. There has never been any 
dispute that petitioner is an employee covered by the 
ADEA. The decision of the Third Circuit rests solely 
on its holding- contrary to the Seventh Circuit de-
cision in Levin I - that the ADEA precludes any 
section 1983 Equal Protection action for age discrimi-
nation. 
Respondents argue that, even if the Third Circuit 
decision is overturned, they may ultimately prevail 
on other grounds. They contend that the complaint in 
this case lacks sufficient allegations to establish lia-
bility under Monell v. Department of Social Services 
of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Br.Opp. 15-
17. But that proffered defense, as respondents acknowl-
edge, is "an independent, alternative" issue (Br.Opp. 
15), in no way related to the preclusion question. "The 
Third Circuit never addressed this separate [ground]" 
13 
(Br.Opp. 17), and respondents do not suggest that 
this Court itself should consider that issue. If pe-
titioner prevails in this Court on the question of 
whether the ADEA precludes his section 1983 claim, 




For the above reasons, a writ of certiorari should 
issue to review the judgment and opinion of the Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit. 
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